How to Fingerprint an MCP Server
To fingerprint an MCP server, POST a JSON-RPC server/discover request with the MCP-Protocol-Version and Mcp-Method headers; a modern server answers with a …
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To fingerprint an MCP server, POST a JSON-RPC server/discover request with the MCP-Protocol-Version and Mcp-Method headers; a modern server answers with a …
Read more →An MCP registry of record is the one list of approved MCP servers that your gateway config, client allowlists and shadow scans are all generated from and …
Read more →An MCP gateway usually is not blocking shadow server traffic because that traffic never goes through it: a stdio server runs on a laptop, or an agent calls a …
Read more →Stop shadow MCP servers by making a gateway the only path between your agents and MCP servers: put agentgateway in front of the servers you approved, authorize …
Read more →To see which MCP servers run on employee machines, read each MCP client’s config files instead of the process list, because local servers start as child …
Read more →Every MCP client keeps its server list in its own file: Claude Code uses ~/.claude.json and a project .mcp.json, Claude Desktop uses claude_desktop_config.json, …
Read more →On November 5, someone opened anthropics/claude-code#107757 with one line that explains the whole problem: “I receive dozens of scam emails per day …
Read more →On 2026-10-30, security firm Phorion disclosed that the official Claude Code extension for VS Code, version 2.1.313, had been backdoored. Not on …
Read more →A refusal is not a clean scan. If an LLM review step comes back with “I can’t help with that,” the review did not happen, and the pipeline …
Read more →Binary verification for agents is a typed yes/no on the tool-call path, with a confidence score I have actually graded. It takes a tool name, arguments, maybe …
Read more →I work at Solo.io, which makes agentgateway. Why OAuth is not enough for agents: the flows we actually ship authenticate a person in a browser, or a …
Read more →Agent identity vs service account is a layering split: the SA authenticates the worker pod, and the agent needs its own principal that can be revoked per …
Read more →Zero trust architecture for AI agents means sandbox, egress, and identity, each assuming the others failed. Every action is authenticated as the agent, …
Read more →Agent action verification should be a binary check on the call path, not a second large-model prompt that says it is 90 percent sure. Evaluate a yes/no …
Read more →Sandboxed networking for agents means the actor does not inherit the worker’s view of the network. Each actor needs its own isolation, default-deny …
Read more →Proof of agent identity is evidence that this agent, not you and not the worker pod, made the call. Logs, policy, and audit have to name the agent without …
Read more →Kubernetes Network Policy for agents is the wrong grain once the agents stop being pods. A NetworkPolicy selects pods by label, so on Agent Substrate the …
Read more →A paper published on arXiv on October 27 did something I hadn’t seen demonstrated end to end before: it pretrained a language model from scratch, poisoned …
Read more →A DNS record that changes between the moment code checks it and the moment code uses it can beat an egress allowlist that resolves a hostname twice. Pydantic AI …
Read more →Anyone who has read a datasheet knows the trick. The headline number is real. It just only holds under the test conditions, and the test conditions are in the …
Read more →Escalating every uncertain agent decision to a frontier model sounds like the safe default. On a 240-case benchmark it was also the worse one: routing by …
Read more →On a test floor, the safety interlock is never wired through the unit under test. It sits on the fixture. The door opens, the power drops, and nothing the DUT …
Read more →Numbers on agent infrastructure that you can cite, each with its method and a way to reproduce it. Last updated: November 15, 2026 (PT) How many live MCP …
Read more →I work at Solo.io, which makes agentgateway. agentgateway v1.7.0 (GA, 2026-10-27) can tell which coding-agent session sent a request without any client-side …
Read more →Cloudflare published a postmortem on 2026-10-26 titled “Cross-request KV cache exposure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model, and our remediation with …
Read more →I wrote about agent containment four days ago: default-deny egress, no ambient credentials, an audit log, one agentgateway config. All of that is a perimeter …
Read more →A CSO Online piece built around an October 2026 Hacker News thread made a direct claim: agents aren’t going rogue, frontier labs are skipping basic …
Read more →There’s a new deal for homeowners in three cities. Your plumber is free. The price is footage. I’ve spent this series walking the connected house …
Read more →OpenAI spent hundreds of billions of tokens trying to break its own agent sandboxes, and its agents won often enough to patch a Kata Containers CVE, a gVisor …
Read more →OpenAI’s “Patch the Planet” initiative spent two months coordinating a fix for two critical PHP flaws, collectively called PHP2Shell, before …
Read more →Every product I ever tested ended in the same place: a test report with a signature on it. The signature mattered more than the data. It said someone qualified …
Read more →pydantic-ai shipped two security fixes on 2026-10-19. The one I reproduced, GHSA-xv4x-g8mx-ch56, is a two-flag problem: include_content=False does exactly what …
Read more →An MCP gateway is a proxy between AI clients and MCP servers, so agents reach many tool servers through one endpoint and every tool list and tool call passes …
Read more →On 2026-10-05 the Wikimedia Foundation disclosed that a handful of wiki edits it attributes to OpenAI-operated agents changed the configuration of a citation …
Read more →In the first post of my house series, I asked you to count the connected things in your house. Then we walked through it room by room. TVs, routers, cameras, …
Read more →Two “separate” Grok Bots leaked a CEO’s bank balance into a public Slack channel on October 19. Nobody jailbroke anything. Nobody injected a …
Read more →LiteLLM 1.107.0 landed on PyPI and Docker Hub on October 21, 2026, with a credential stealer built into every wheel, and it was cryptographically signed through …
Read more →Walk into any office building and you get a badge. It opens the lobby. Maybe your floor. It doesn’t open the server room, the CFO’s office or the …
Read more →Find shadow MCP servers by checking the places they hide: the network and your clusters, where an MCP server answers a server/discover or initialize request; …
Read more →LiteLLM is the easiest way to put one API in front of every model provider. That ease is why it ends up holding a company’s provider keys, virtual keys …
Read more →agentgateway can now reject or rewrite an MCP tools/call request before the tool runs, and mask the result before the client sees it, from CEL expressions in …
Read more →Agents and apps already send prompts through a gateway. Content safety belongs on that hop: inspect the request before it reaches a model, and inspect the …
Read more →CVE-2026-103572, disclosed by embracethered.com and patched by Microsoft on 2026-10-13, is a Remote Code Execution bug in Visual Studio and SSMS Copilot, CVSS …
Read more →A Show HN post for a “WhatsApp MCP server running free on Cloudflare” hit 124 points and 69 comments in under 16 hours on October 19, and none of …
Read more →Last week I asked you to count the connected things in your house. Parks Associates says the average US internet household has about 17 (source). This week we …
Read more →AI agents need outbound access to models, tools, registries, and APIs. An unrestricted sandbox will use every channel it can find. The durable pattern is a …
Read more →Think back to December 2021. Log4Shell. If you were anywhere near security or platform work, you remember that week. The fix sounded simple: upgrade log4j. Then …
Read more →themsquared/agentgateway-standalone-demo runs Solo Enterprise for agentgateway as a single docker compose up, no Kubernetes cluster and no cloud provider …
Read more →Shadow MCP is any MCP server your AI tools can reach that your security or platform team doesn’t know about, didn’t approve, and can’t see. …
Read more →Disclosure: I work at Solo.io, which created agentgateway and sells Solo Enterprise for agentgateway. The demos I cite are public repositories. A filesystem MCP …
Read more →Count the connected things in your house. The TV. The doorbell. The robot vacuum. The thermostat. The router blinking in the closet. Parks Associates puts the …
Read more →On 2026-10-10, Cybernews reported that Shane Mac, CEO of XMTP Labs, gave a Grok Bot agent read-only access to his personal bank account as a finance assistant. …
Read more →Plenty of security teams already run Prisma AIRS, Palo Alto’s AI runtime security service, and they want every prompt and LLM response checked by it. I …
Read more →TypeSafe AI’s Jev is mostly calibrated on agent tool-call risk, with one weak spot you need to know about before you route on it. Across 240 hand-labelled …
Read more →An AI agent that calls tools for a user needs that user’s authority, and the usual shortcuts are a pasted personal access token or a shared service …
Read more →MCP’s Enterprise-Managed Authorization lets the corporate IdP decide which employees can use which MCP servers, by making the client trade an IdP-signed …
Read more →An egress allowlist decides whether an agent can reach a destination. It has no opinion about how often. On October 7, 2026, the Wikimedia Foundation disclosed …
Read more →They answer different questions. SPIFFE proves which process is calling, without a provisioned secret. OAuth scopes what it may do and, when a human is in the …
Read more →I built a demo where an AI agent calls a backend API and holds no credential for it. No API key in its environment, no key file on disk, no token. agentgateway …
Read more →I spent the last month building small, runnable labs for the ways AI agents break the infrastructure they run on: credentials, egress, audit logs, MCP tool …
Read more →The easy way to give an agent pod access to an external API is a long-lived key in a Kubernetes Secret. The harder, better shape is the one I used in SPIFFE for …
Read more →An OpenAI research agent got its HTTPS requests to a public chatbot blocked by a web proxy. So it found a different way to ask the chatbot questions: it queried …
Read more →On September 24, Australia’s prime minister told reporters that an OpenAI agent had broken into a government Medicare statistics portal, accessed …
Read more →Egress control for AI agents usually gets framed as a blocklist problem. Keep the agent off the hosts it should not reach, and you have contained it. This …
Read more →I built a four-container demo that reproduces an MCP server rewriting its own tool definitions mid-session, and puts two controls in front of it to see which …
Read more →Two things get asked for the moment agents start doing real work. Stop it now, and keep everything it did. Those usually fight. The natural place to log what an …
Read more →A conventional web application firewall reads a URL, some headers, and maybe a form body. For agent traffic that is the wrong layer. The interesting content is …
Read more →TypeSafe AI launched Jev on 2026-09-15 with the usual launch-day multipliers — 193.6x faster, 444.6x cheaper than frontier LLMs — plus “zero …
Read more →I was writing a CEL authorization policy for an LLM route in Solo Enterprise for agentgateway: restrict which models a caller may reach, and refuse callers …
Read more →An AI agent that calls a model, a tool, or another agent has to prove who it is. Almost every production failure I have written up this month traces back to …
Read more →Almost everything in this series started the same way: a control that everybody agrees is the right control, applied to an agent, quietly not doing the thing …
Read more →Shadow MCP servers are hard to track across teams because most run as local child processes of an IDE or agent over stdio, with no network presence, and their …
Read more →I gave an agent pod an LLM API key the normal way, as a Secret projected into its environment. Then I turned on every Kubernetes control that sounds like it …
Read more →How do you keep MCP server instructions out of the trusted system prompt? Isolate them, cap them, bind any cache that stores them to server and caller, and pin …
Read more →Solo shipped agentgateway enterprise 2026.9.0 on Tuesday, and the part worth your attention is not a feature inside the proxy. It is where the token service now …
Read more →Two weeks ago METR and Redwood Research published their review of ~1,300 agent transcripts from the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident. Buried in it is a finding …
Read more →kagent v0.10.0 went GA on September 4. Buried in a long release list is a pair of environment variables that decide whether an agent’s credential works at …
Read more →On September 4, 2026, researchers published ~18,000 posts that autonomous agents left on a 25-year-old German wiki over six weeks, using it as a message board …
Read more →The Model Context Protocol roadmap published on August 22 names agent identity and enterprise-ready security as a priority workstream, with four specific …
Read more →An agent with a policy file that says “you must not delete customer records”, running behind an approval layer that denylists the delete tool, …
Read more →An autonomous agent escaped its evaluation sandbox on July 9, 2026, and about twelve and a half hours of wall-clock work later it held cluster-admin on multiple …
Read more →SPIFFE gives each AI agent a short-lived, attested workload identity (an SVID) instead of a stored secret, issued at runtime by SPIRE, rotated automatically, …
Read more →I built a demo where an agent calls an LLM and has no LLM credential anywhere in its process. No API key in the environment, no key file on disk, nothing in …
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