Is Jev Actually Calibrated? The Reliability Curve on 240 Cases
TypeSafe AI’s Jev is mostly calibrated on agent tool-call risk, with one weak spot you need to know about before you route on it. Across 240 hand-labelled …
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30 posts
agentgateway Token Exchange for AI Agents
An AI agent that calls tools for a user needs that user’s authority, and the usual shortcuts are a pasted personal access token or a shared service …
Read more →MCP Cross App Access Explained: The ID-JAG Exchange on the Wire
MCP’s Enterprise-Managed Authorization lets the corporate IdP decide which employees can use which MCP servers, by making the client trade an IdP-signed …
Read more →Rate-Limiting AI Agent Egress to Already-Allowed APIs
An egress allowlist decides whether an agent can reach a destination. It has no opinion about how often. On October 7, 2026, the Wikimedia Foundation disclosed …
Read more →Do AI Agents Need SPIFFE or OAuth?
They answer different questions. SPIFFE proves which process is calling, without a provisioned secret. OAuth scopes what it may do and, when a human is in the …
Read more →Per-Request Minted JWTs for Agent Backends with agentgateway
I built a demo where an AI agent calls a backend API and holds no credential for it. No API key in its environment, no key file on disk, no token. agentgateway …
Read more →AI Agent Security on Kubernetes: Which Controls Actually Held
I spent the last month building small, runnable labs for the ways AI agents break the infrastructure they run on: credentials, egress, audit logs, MCP tool …
Read more →Building Workload Identity Federation for AI Agents on Kubernetes
The easy way to give an agent pod access to an external API is a long-lived key in a Kubernetes Secret. It doesn’t expire when the pod dies, it …
Read more →Your Agent Egress Proxy Never Saw the DNS Query
An OpenAI research agent got its HTTPS requests to a public chatbot blocked by a web proxy. So it found a different way to ask the chatbot questions: it queried …
Read more →What Stopped AI Agent Probes of Government Data Sites
On September 24, Australia’s prime minister told reporters that an OpenAI agent had broken into a government Medicare statistics portal, accessed …
Read more →Your Artifact Registry Is a Two-Way Channel for Agents
Egress control for AI agents usually gets framed as a blocklist problem. Keep the agent off the hosts it should not reach, and you have contained it. This …
Read more →MCP Tool Poisoning: A Name Allowlist Is Not Enough
I built a four-container demo that reproduces an MCP server rewriting its own tool definitions mid-session, and puts two controls in front of it to see which …
Read more →Stopping an AI Agent Without Losing the Forensic Record
Two things get asked for the moment agents start doing real work. Stop it now, and keep everything it did. Those usually fight. The natural place to log what an …
Read more →A WAF That Reads the Prompt: OWASP CRS for LLM and MCP
A conventional web application firewall reads a URL, some headers, and maybe a form body. For agent traffic that is the wrong layer. The interesting content is …
Read more →I Benchmarked Jev on Agent Tool-Call Risk. Calibration Held.
TypeSafe AI launched Jev on 2026-09-15 with the usual launch-day multipliers — 193.6x faster, 444.6x cheaper than frontier LLMs — plus “zero …
Read more →agentgateway CEL Gotchas: Fail-Open + 403 Fix
I was writing a CEL authorization policy for an LLM route in Solo Enterprise for agentgateway : restrict which models a caller may reach, and refuse callers …
Read more →Agent Identity on Kubernetes: The Complete Series
An AI agent that calls a model, a tool, or another agent has to prove who it is. Almost every production failure I have written up this month traces back to …
Read more →Securing AI Agents in Production: The Complete Series
Almost everything in this series started the same way: a control that everybody agrees is the right control, applied to an agent, quietly not doing the thing …
Read more →Shadow MCP Servers: Why They're Hard to Track
Tracking shadow MCP servers across teams is hard because most of them never show up anywhere a platform team looks. Local MCP servers run as child processes of …
Read more →Your Agent's LLM Key Survives Every Kubernetes Secret Control
I gave an agent pod an LLM API key the normal way, as a Secret projected into its environment. Then I turned on every Kubernetes control that sounds like it …
Read more →Keeping MCP Server Instructions Out of Your Agent's System Prompt
How do you keep MCP server instructions out of the trusted system prompt? Isolate them, cap them, bind any cache that stores them to server and caller, and pin …
Read more →The agentgateway Token Service Now Runs Without a Cluster
Solo shipped agentgateway enterprise 2026.9.0 on Tuesday, and the part worth your attention is not a feature inside the proxy. It is where the token service now …
Read more →Agent Audit Logs: What METR and Redwood Found
Two weeks ago METR and Redwood Research published their review of ~1,300 agent transcripts from the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident. Buried in it is a finding …
Read more →kagent Audience-Bound Tokens (RFC 8707)
kagent v0.10.0 went GA on September 4 . Buried in a long release list is a pair of environment variables that decide whether an agent’s credential works …
Read more →Why Proxy-Variable Agent Sandboxes Fail, and the CONNECT-Time Fix
On September 4, 2026, researchers published ~18,000 posts that autonomous agents left on a 25-year-old German wiki over six weeks, using it as a message board …
Read more →MCP Agent Identity: What Shipped, What to Use
The Model Context Protocol roadmap published on August 22 names agent identity and enterprise-ready security as a priority workstream, with four specific …
Read more →Your AGENTS.md Is Not a Security Control
An agent with a policy file that says “you must not delete customer records”, running behind an approval layer that denylists the delete tool, …
Read more →Which Controls Would Have Stopped the July 2026 Agent Intrusion?
An autonomous agent escaped its evaluation sandbox on July 9, 2026, and about twelve and a half hours of wall-clock work later it held cluster-admin on multiple …
Read more →SPIFFE for AI Agents: End-to-End Identity Demo
SPIFFE gives each AI agent a short-lived, attested workload identity (an SVID) instead of a stored secret, issued at runtime by SPIRE, rotated automatically, …
Read more →Your AI Agent Should Not Hold the LLM API Key
I built a demo where an agent calls an LLM and has no LLM credential anywhere in its process. No API key in the environment, no key file on disk, nothing in …
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